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Long-term absenteeism due to sickness in Sweden. 
How long does it take and what happens after? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyze exits from long-term sickness spells in 
Sweden. Using spell data for more than 2500 people, aged 20-64 
years during 1986-1991, and who had at least one sickness spell 
of at least 60 days during 1986-1989, the aim is to analyze the 
transition to different states, i.e., return to work, full disability 
pension, partial disability pension, and other exits from the labor 
force. Given the complexity of the exit decision, which 
encompasses both the individual’s choice, the medical 
evaluation and the decision of the insurance adjudicator, we will 
consider the outcome as being the result of two aspects of the 
exit processes: an aspect that governs the duration of a spell 
prior the decision to exit, and another that governs the type of 
exit. Therefore, the analysis will be done in two steps: First, we 
will analyze the duration of the sickness spells, and then we will 
analyze the process that governs the type of exit. The results 
indicate that both individual characteristics, and push factors, 
such as regional unemployment, are important for both 
components of the decision process. 
 
Key words: Long-term sickness, returns to work, full and partial 
disability, spell data, competing risks model, multinomial logit 
model. 
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1 Introduction 
Long-term absenteeism due to sickness has been increasing in 
Sweden during the past two decades, raising many questions 
about causes, financing, and policy measures to prevent further 
increases. The extent to which increased absence due to sickness 
is attributable to changes in actual or perceived poor health 
among the employed is not easy to determine. Also, it cannot be 
ruled out that in the long term a change in the level of absence 
may be due to changing attitudes and values with regard to 
reporting sick. However, sickness-spell indicators probably do 
not give an accurate image of the average health of neither the 
Swedish population nor the working-age population. Given the 
generosity of the social insurance system, people can choose to 
leave the labor market, permanently or temporarily more easier 
now than 30-50 years ago. Moreover, people are better informed 
about health risks, and they can invest more in their health 
throughout their lifetime.  
 Even though it is expected that investment in health 
(especially, maintaining a good diet, exercising, etc.) drives the 
path of choices available for people, the question is how long 
does a person wait until to leave the labor market, and then what 
path is she or he choosing? The empirical literature on labor 
market participation, explaining whether or not people work in 
general, is vast, but there is relatively little research focused on 
disability exits per se (see Haveman and Wolfe (2000)’s survey 
and discussion of the main lines of economic research 
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addressing the issues of economic status and behavior of the 
working-age population with disabilities). 
 The effects of health on labor market participation are 
theoretically ambiguous, although most research seems to 
assume that poor health will decrease participation. Little 
consensus on the magnitude of the effects has been reached, 
mainly due to different definitions of health. Until the late 1980s 
most of the literature on labor market participation concentrated 
on factors that influence the number of hours worked, but few 
studies attempted to distinguish different non-working states, 
such as unemployment, long-term sickness, disability, or early-
retirement for other reasons. Those studies that have focused on 
transitions between states have mainly examined on the 
transition to and from unemployment. Nevertheless, there is an 
emerging genre of literature focusing on retirement decisions of 
the older labor force, and there is also quite a vast literature 
regarding the labor force participation of older workers. Bound 
and Burkhauser (1999) reviewed the literature on the labor 
supply of people with disability and how it is affected by 
disability program characteristics. They concluded that 
empirical analyses of programs targeted on individuals with 
disabilities have focused almost exclusively on trying to 
understand the behavioral effects of such programs. During the 
1990s there was growing research evidence suggesting that there 
are many people recorded as long-term sick who could also be 
classified as unemployed. This calls into question the quality of 
both the sickness and unemployment statistics. For example in 
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the UK such concerns have been raised at the national level by 
Disney and Webb (1991) and at regional and local levels by 
Forsythe (1995), and by Beatty and Fothergill (1996).  
 The literature on labor force participation in Sweden 
contains some studies that found that the rules’ change have a 
significant effect on sickness absenteeism; e.g., Latto and 
Lindblom (1987), Johansson and Palme, (1996, 2002), 
Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Bäckman (1998), Lidwall and 
Thoursie (2000), Andrén (2001a, 2001b, 2001c), Broström et al. 
(2002), Henrekson and Persson (2002), and Skogman Thoursie 
(2002). These studies used different databases and statistical 
methods, the most common setup being to analyze how 
absenteeism differs across individuals with respect to individual 
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, earnings, etc.). 
Economic incentives are captured by the after-tax wage rate, or 
the difference (or ratio) between the wage rate and the sick-leave 
compensation. The analyses are done either at a single point in 
time, or over time. The latest data format (being time series or 
longitudinal) allows for variation in economic incentives, 
individuals differing with respect to marginal tax rates, 
compensation levels, or other aspects of the insurance scheme.  
Given the complexity of the decision to exit the labor 
market, which encompasses both the individual’s choice, the 
medical evaluation, and the decision of the insurance 
adjudicator, this study considers the outcome as being the result 
of two aspects of the exit processes: an aspect that governs the 
duration of a spell prior the decision to exit, and another that 
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governs the type of exit. Therefore the analysis is done in two 
steps, using a longitudinal database: First, we will analyze the 
spells of sickness, estimating nonparametically the survival and 
hazard functions, and then estimating a competing risks model 
(distinguish different types of exit). Second, we will analyze the 
process that governs the type of exit by using a multinomial 
logit model. 
The study is organized as follows. The next section briefly 
presents some social insurance facts related to sickness in 
Sweden, upon which our study is based. Section 3  discusses the 
supply and demand of labor, stressing health aspects, while 
sections 4, 5, and 6 present the data, the econometric 
framework, and the estimated results. The last section 
summarizes and draws conclusions. 
 
2 Social insurance during the study period 
All residents in Sweden with an annual estimated earned 
income, from either employment or self-employment, of at least 
6000 Swedish crowns (during the period analyzed by this study) 
are covered by the national insurance regulations on cash 
benefits during illness or injury. Those entitled to use the 
Swedish health services at subsidized prices are all residents of 
Sweden regardless of nationality, as well as patients seeking 
emergency attention from EU/EEA countries and some other 
countries with which Sweden has a special convention. 
 People with relatively high incomes do not, however, 
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receive payments from the social insurance office for the entire 
amount of income lost, in that the insured earned income is 
limited to of 7.5 times the base amount, although mandatory 
social security contributions for insurance purposes are levied 
on their entire income. In 1991 (the end of the analyzed period), 
the base amount was 32,200 Swedish kronor (U.S.$1.00 equals 
about 10 kronor in December 2000). This amount is fixed for 
one year at a time, and it is appreciated in the line with price 
changes, which are, in turn, measured using the Retail price 
index.  
 A sickness benefit (sick-pay) is available for an unlimited 
period when an illness reduces working capacity by at least 25 
percent.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, social insurance rules 
changed largely in response to economic developments, with 
expansion during the good years, and cut backs in bad times. 
During the period studied (1986-1991), there were two main 
social insurance reforms, which took effect December 1, 1987 
and March 1, 1991.  
The first change followed an economic expansion in the 
middle of the 1980s when the national economy grew at a 
relatively rapid rate, and unemployment was the lowest since the 
mid 1970s. From December 1, 1987 sickness insurance began to 
cover the loss of earnings from the first day the illness was 
reported; previously there had been an unpaid one-day waiting 
period. Both before and after, the replacement rate was 90%. 
Additionally, the 1987 reform constrained the compensation’s 
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payment of the first 14 days of sickness only to those days when 
people were scheduled to work, which affected compensations 
for persons with irregular schedules. 
The second change took place in 1991, the year when 
Sweden began a recession period. The replacement rate for the 
sickness benefit had been 90% from the first day since 
December 1987, but from March 1, 1991, this replacement rate 
was not used until after the 90th day of the sickness spell. Only 
65% was now paid for the first three days of the sickness spell, 
and 80% from then through  the 90th day. However most 
workers also received another 10% from negotiated benefits 
(i.e., paid directly by their employer, not by the social insurance 
system), which meant that, for them, the greatest difference was 
during the first 3 days.  
During the period analyzed, a self-employed person could 
opt for a waiting period of 3 or 30 days, the sickness insurance 
premium being lower for the longer waiting period.  
Since July 1, 1990, there have been four rates of sickness 
cash benefits (full, 75%, 50%, and 25%; that is, one can be on 
sick leave full-time or partial (75%, 50%, or 25%). Previously 
only full or 50% could be obtained. The idea behind allowing 
more partial rates is to aid the gradual return of persons with 
more serious illness.  
Since this study focuses on long-term spells, the changes 
in rules that occurred during the period analyzed would not be 
expected to have much effect on the analysis. 
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3 Reduced working capacity and labor market participation 
3.1 The supply of labor 
Health status may affect the labor supply decision by changing 
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption. Poor health or injury increases the disutility from 
work, and creates incentives for leaving the labor market 
temporarily or permanently, since it makes leisure more 
valuable relative to work. Human capital is typically acquired at 
different rates over the working career. For earnings to rise in 
early years, relatively more capital must be acquired, and if the 
earnings profile is then to turn down, as statistical evidence 
suggests, relatively less capital must be acquired later. 
The theory of human capital developed by Ben-Porath 
(1967) suggests that individuals make incremental decisions 
about new investments in human capital by performing a sort of 
mental cost-benefit analysis. In empirical analyses, devised cost 
and benefit measures for costs and benefits can approximate 
this. Costs can be explicit, such as those accompanying a 
decision to spend time in education, or implicit, for example if 
one decides to train on the job, with the possible consequence of 
foregoing (higher) immediate earnings. The cost of investment 
in the first case is the wage not received, while in the second 
case, is the higher wage not received in the short-run. In both 
cases there is the prospect of doing better in the long run. People 
do not have the same marginal cost or marginal benefit curves. 
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Persons with greater endowments of intelligence, social 
competence, etc. can be expected to gain more from a given 
investment. Furthermore, a strong initial investment in schooling 
or in other forms of training may make it easier to enhance 
human capital later, at a lower cost, while its lack may make it 
harder. This would explain why persons with lower initial 
educational attainment also tend to have smaller later additional 
increments to human capital. 
If people invest in human capital at a decreasing rate as 
they age, then their total stock of human capital will also 
increase at a decreasing rate, or even decrease, due to 
“depreciation”. In order to maintain a given level of earnings, 
acquisitions of job knowledge must at least equal this 
depreciation. For many, this may simply mean keeping up 
through “learning by doing” daily tasks on the job. For others, 
who might be stuck in a “fixed” technology, i.e., with little 
“learning by doing” renewal opportunities, the situation might 
be worse and earnings could stagnate or even decline as they 
age. They would certainly decline in a free labor market setting 
where hourly earnings were related to productivity. 
This interpretation of the theory suggests that persons with 
lengthy spells of sickness, even if they become completely well 
afterwards, will lose some job experience, and may lose some 
relative job productivity. On the other hand, people with 
sickness whose human capital is low (highly depreciated) might 
find long-term sickness leading to disability to be a way out of 
the predicament. Certainly, long periods of sickness can deplete 
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workplace specific capital, as the dynamics of the workplace 
continue. 
The seriousness of these problems will depend on 
individual characteristics, the length of sickness and the 
requirements of the job. Persons with jobs requiring a lower 
level of skills or less ongoing technical training would 
experience less serious problems than would persons with jobs 
requiring more. Also, the effort, and associated costs, to the 
individual to recapture a training loss, will by definition be 
greater the higher are the demands of the job.  
There may also be an interaction between the type of 
sickness and human capital. For example, chronic 
musculoskeletal problems might make it more difficult to 
perform specific tasks, e.g., stationary tasks or tasks requiring 
heavy or awkward lifts; depression might make it more difficult 
to work in an environment where a high level of social 
competence is necessary; etc. One would need a sophisticated 
and large database in order to estimate these kinds of 
interactions. 
Because of sickness, an individual’s capacity may thus be 
temporarily or permanently reduced, at least vis à vis a specific 
work task. This suggests a decline in productivity with a given 
human capital profile, or technically speaking, what we might 
call extra human capital depreciation.  
Of course, changing employers is easier in a tight labor 
market rather than in a labor market with high unemployment 
and few new openings, and it is also easier the larger the local 
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job market is. There are other considerations to changing 
employers, however, among them the total cost for the family: 
An overall household calculation might show that the most 
desirable alternative is to stay put in a situation with lower 
earnings potential, because it costs something to search for a 
new job, it costs to move, and it may be difficult for a spouse to 
get their reservation earnings in another location.  
Changing occupations usually involves an even higher 
cost, and probably a more uncertain outcome, the older one is. 
In addition, the older one is, the fewer are the remaining years of 
benefits to be reaped from a given investment in 
training/education. This, together with the other disadvantages 
listed above, might weight the calculation in favor of no move. 
Reduced earnings capacity due to sickness may or may not 
qualify the individual for a partial disability benefit, depending 
on the social-insurance legislation in a country and how it is 
applied in practice. In addition, the medical condition may only 
be temporary, in which case the individual may not want to 
apply for disability benefit.      
3.2 The demand for labor 
Individual earnings are a result of demand as well as supply. In a 
competitive market profit-maximizing employers will seek out 
employees whose human capital best suits the requirements of a 
job at the lowest cost. Given this perspective, employers have no 
reason to discriminate against persons who have been sick, as 
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long as their human capital is not perceived as being impaired. 
In fact, human capital may in part be employer or even 
employer-task specific, rather than general, which means that 
there are hiring and training costs associated with acquiring new 
employees. In this case, it is also costly to lay off persons if their 
only problem is that they are temporarily sick, even if the spell 
is long. 
If the normal situation is that sickness does not impair 
human capital or work capacity, and if future performance 
and/or sickness is not normally a function of past sickness, then 
(ceteris paribus) we should not be able to observe differences 
between the earnings of persons with lengthy sickness history 
and those persons without. For example, Andrén and Palmer 
(2001) analyzed the effect of sickness on earnings, and 
concluded that people can expect some decrease in annual 
earnings during the period after they experience long-term 
sickness. This could be explained by the fact that some choose 
to work part time after their sickness spells or not at all, while 
others choose an exit into temporary or permanent disability, 
which also decreases their earnings. 
 So long as there is no rational reason for wage differences 
between persons with a history of sickness and others, i.e., due 
to reduced productivity per hour, or reduced capacity to work a 
normal number of hours, or to increased inconvenience costs, 
then any observed differences would be due to discrimination. 
However, if sickness is normally a function of past sickness, i.e., 
if there are “sick” people and “healthy” people, then employers 
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might be expected to offer lower wages to the “sick” people, 
because absenteeism does create costs for the employer, through 
inconvenience (and lower overall productivity) at the workplace. 
Then cost conscious employers, behaving rationally, would take 
this increased risk into account when establishing pay-rates.  
There is evidence from the time covered previous to this 
study that persons who are sick longer periods have a higher 
probability of recurring long spells. According to Swedish data 
for the period 1979-1986, almost 60% of those who had been 
sick for 30 days or more had a new case of at least 60 days in 
the following year. This means that there is a higher risk of 
incurring inconvenience costs with persons with substantial 
previous sickness. 
3.3 Labor market participation 
We have some means at our disposal for testing whether effects 
originate from supply or demand. Decreased hours of work after 
sickness would be a supply effect, as this would be a decision 
that rests with the individual. Transition into partial or full 
disability status is also a clear supply effect. Given the 
institutional settings, the exit alternatives from a spell of long-
term sickness for persons younger than 65 are: return to work, 
temporary or permanent exit with full or partial disability, and 
other non-working exits (i.e., unemployment, immigration or 
return to the home country). The sickness benefit is available for 
an unlimited period, and given the medical evaluation, the 
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patient can choose the exit alternative that maximizes their 
utility. Given the requirement of a medical evaluation, the 
patient’s final decision does not look as if it is a choice. 
Following the medical evaluation, the doctor can suggest 
different alternatives, but the employee is the one who really 
decides. We are all familiar with the fact that there are people 
who prefer to work even though they have the opportunity to 
leave the labor market with a disability benefit. The real 
problem is the difficulty to adapt work environment or find a 
proper job for their health status. Additionally, it is not clear 
which are the factors that steer people toward one of these 
alternatives. Are people’s decisions related to the duration of the 
sickness spell, and what determines this? How important is the 
diagnosis? Do economic incentives influence the choice?   
4 Data 
The data analyzed came the Long-term Sickness (LS) database 
of the Swedish National Social Insurance Board. A random 
sample (LSIP) was used, representing all residents in Sweden 
registered with the social insurance office, and born during 
1926-1966, who had had at least one sickness spell of at least 60 
days during the period 1986-1989. The LSIP sample contains 
information on 2666 individuals. For all sickness spells, the 
exact starting dates are known, so the analyzed spells are not left 
censored, but the sickness history data are left truncated before 
1983. At the end of the observation period, some persons 
continued to be sick, so these spells are right censored. Table 1 
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presents descriptive statistics of the “first” spells by exit type.  
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
The majority (about 76%) returned to work, while the rest 
either exits into full disability, partial disability, or other (non-
working) exits. As expected, people who exited into disability 
(both full and partial) had longer spells (more than 600 days) 
that those who returned to work (109 days). Detailed descriptive 
statistics of the data by individual, and by spell are presented in 
Appendix (Tables A1 and A2). 
 
5 Econometric framework 
All the individuals studied here were sick for at least 60 days. 
The duration of absence as well as the exit is one of the 
outcomes of a medical examination. There is no standard 
duration for most diagnoses, and even if there is a norm, 
individual cases can vary greatly around this norm. The 
determinant for receiving a benefit is reduced work capacity, 
which also depends on the work situation. On top of this, it is 
the individual him/herself who must relate to doctor how he/she 
feels, and this is obviously a subjective measure. A natural way 
to depict this process is to estimate first a model for the timing 
of the events, and then a (second) model for the type of event. 
For the timing of events, we will estimate a competing risks 
model, while for the type of event we will estimate a 
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multinomial logit. 
 The spells of long-term sickness can be analyzed 
regardless of exit type, which might be a perfectly acceptable 
way to proceed (see for example, Andrén, 2001b). However, 
more often than not, it is desirable to distinguish different kinds 
of events and treat them differently in the analysis. In other 
words, it is essential to use a competing risks model instead of a 
single risk model (See, for example, Han and Hausman (1990), 
Pudney and Thomas (1995), and Van den Berg (2000) for 
technical details and applications). This may give supplementary 
information about a different impact of various factors on 
different exit types. Therefore, we would distinguish different 
types of exit (i.e., return to work, full disability, partial disability 
and “other” exit) and treat them differently in the analysis by 
using the method of competing risks.  
The competing risks approach presumes that each event 
type has its own hazard that governs both occurrence and timing 
of events of that type. A reduced picture of this approach is one 
of independent causal mechanisms operating in parallel: for the 
analyzed spells, the production of an output excludes the 
production of the other events.  
 If we “subdivide” exits from spells of long-term sickness 
into four types (return to work, full disability, partial disability, 
and other exits), under the competing risks approach this implies 
that there are four parallel processes, an assumption that may not 
hold for many cases. Rather, there is a process that governs the 
decision to exit, and another that governs the type of exit. For 
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analyzing the type of exit, a binomial or multinomial logit model 
is a natural choice, although there are certainly alternatives.     
When choosing the exit pathway at the end of a sickness 
spell, an employee is assumed to maximize her or his lifetime 
utility. McFadden (1974) shows how the multinomial logit 
model can be derived from utility maximization. Consider that 
the utility of an employee i is associated with J alternatives. We 
assume that for an employee who has been long term sick, the 
utility from choosing alternative j is expressed by  
(1) ijijij xvU ε+= )(   
where x is the vector of individual characteristics, and εij is an 
unobservable random variable. The vector of characteristics can 
be separated into two parts: one, which   varies across the 
choices and possibly across the individuals as well, and the other 
contains the individual characteristics that are the same for all 
choices. The alternatives for the exits from long term sickness 
are specified with respect to the available data: RW for return to 
work, FD for full (temporary or permanent) disability benefit, 
PD for partial (temporary or permanent) disability benefit, and 
O for other non-working states (homemaking, unemployment, 
emigration, incarceration, etc.).   
The employee's optimization problem is the maximization 
of his utility function with respect to the alternative j: 
(2) ijj Umax , where j ∈{RW, FD, PD, O}. 
From (6) it follows that the probability that an employee i 
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will choose the optimum alternative j* is  
(3) { } { }**** ,PrPr jjUMaxU jjjjijj ≠∀−+<== θθεε , 
where θj = vij(x). 
McFadden (1974) proved that the multinomial logit is 
derived from utility maximization if and only if the εj 
disturbances are independent, and identically distributed with a 
Weibull distribution. Denoting the density function of εj by f (εj), 
the probability that employee i will choose the alternative j from 
the J given choices is 
(4) 
∑
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,  
where the parameters βk distinguish the x variables. 
There are J - 1 sets of β estimates, so the total number of 
estimates will be (J – 1) × K, which implies that the sample size 
should be larger than (J – 1) × K.  There will be four sets of 
coefficients β(RW), β(FD), β(PD), and β(O) corresponding to 
outcome categories. However, the model is unidentified, in the 
sense that more than one set of betas can lead to the same 
probabilities for the outcomes. To identify the model, one of the 
betas has to be set to zero (an arbitrary choice). The equations 
for the other choices are expressed using this normalization, 
with the numerator is dependent only on the β-coefficients for 
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the choice, and the denominator dependent on the β-coefficients 
for all choices.  
Although the choice of the base-alternative is arbitrary, it 
influences the estimated values of the remaining alternatives, 
and, consequently, the estimated coefficients cannot be 
interpreted straightforwardly. Although it is not very intuitive, 
the β coefficients for each choice can be interpreted as measures 
of the effect of changes in x on the log-odds ratio of alternative j 
relative to the base-alternative. More information about the 
effects of changes in x are given by the marginal effects (for 
continuous variables) and probability differences (for dummy 
variables).  
6 The results 
6.1 Competing risks model 
Figure A1 shows the log-log survival functions for all exit-types 
over the time, without covariates. For all types of exits, more 
than 80% of the spells ended before the third year, which means 
that estimates for later years are based on a relatively small 
number of observations and may be unreliable. The curve for 
return to work is always the highest, while the curve for exit to 
partial disability is much lower than the other three curves 
during the first 2 years. For more information, we also examine 
the smoothed hazard plots (Figure A2). The hazard for return to 
work drops rapidly during the first 420 days of sickness, and 
fluctuates for the rest of the period, while the hazard for full 
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disability exit increases during the first 600 days. This means 
that excepting the relationship between full and partial 
disability, we should reject the proportionality hypothesis. In 
addition to this graphical test, we run a parametric test of the 
proportional hazards hypothesis (Cox and Oakes, 1984), which 
shows that the effect of the time variable is highly significant. 
Both tests indicate the rejection of the proportionality 
hypothesis. Excepting the parameter of the contrast between full 
and partial disability, all other parameters are significant, which 
means that proportionality can be rejected for all pairs of two 
hazard types (Table A4 in the Appendix). 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the computing risks 
model. The age group of 56-65 years, earnings, earnings loss 
and the year dummies 1986 and 1987 are the only variables that 
are statistical significant at the 10% level for all types of exit. 
Other variables (i.e., the other two age group dummies, the 
educational level dummies, regional unemployment rate, the 
other year dummies, and some diagnosis dummies) are 
significant for some exit types, while others (i.e. naturalized 
Swede, and respiratory diagnoses dummies) are not significant 
for any of the exit types.  
Excepting the exit into partial disability, the gender effect 
was significant for all other type of exits, and indicates that 
women had shorter spells than men for both return to work, and 
exit into full disability, but they had longer spells than men for 
“other exits”. The age effect varies across exit types: compared 
to the youngest age group (i.e., younger than 36 years), 
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employees in all other age groups had longer spells of sickness 
before returning to work or exiting into full disability, while 
those who exited into partial disability had shorter spells when 
they were older than 55. 
Excepting both types of exit into disability, married people 
had shorter spells than those with another marital status. This 
could reflect financial pressure if they are the only income 
earners in the family, or if both incomes are needed. It is also 
possible that married persons are healthier, on average. 
 
Table 2 here  
 
Those with higher earnings returned to work faster than 
the other employees, but they had longer spells before full 
disability and “other exits”. Those with higher education who 
exited into full disability, and those with medium or higher 
education who returned to work had shorter spells of sickness 
than those with a lower level of education. Those with medium 
or higher education leaving with an “other exit” had longer 
spells than those with lower education.  
Except the disability exits, for all other exit types, higher 
unemployment rates at the regional social insurance offices level 
implied longer spells of sickness, which could be related to both 
to unemployment fear, or its impact on health status.  
 
6.2 Multinomial logit estimates 
A multinomial model was estimated for the whole sample of the 
“first” spell of long-term sickness, and for sub samples of men 
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and women. Using Hausman's test for independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
(Table A5 in Appendix). This means that, given any particular 
observation, the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two 
alternatives of the response variable is not systematically 
influenced by other alternatives.  
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of the 
multinomial model of exits from long-term sickness, the relative 
risk ratios (RRR), and the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of a given exit from the sickness 
spell. The relative risk ratios report the exponentiated value of 
the coefficient, exp(β). If the RRR = r, and returning to work is 
the reference category, this means that the relative risk of the 
exit j over return to work ratio is r for cases when a dummy 
variable takes value 1 relative to cases with zero value; or r for 
one unit change in the a continuous variable. Then, the 
likelihood of choosing a non-working exit (full disability, partial 
disability, or “other” exit) can then be compared with that of 
returning to work. 
Unlike the analysis of the competing risks model, for 
which the impact of explanatory variable was estimated for each 
exit type, now they were estimated using “return to work” as the 
reference category against other response categories (full 
disability, partial disability, and other exits).  
Compared to men, women had a higher probability to exit 
into full disability and other exits than to return to work. The 
older people were, the higher was the probability that they 
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would exit to either full or partial disability instead of returning 
to work. Foreigners exited into full disability more often than 
did Swedish born people. People with medium or higher 
education had a lower probability of exiting than did those with 
lower education. 
 
Table 3 here  
 
The effect of economic incentives on estimating the 
probability of choosing another exit than return to work is 
estimated by using two variables: earnings (i.e., annual work 
income) at the beginning of each sickness spell, and earnings 
loss related to the sickness spell. Earnings appear to have been 
important, as the likelihood of exiting to a non-working state 
was lower for higher-income earners. On the other hand, the 
estimated parameter for the loss in earnings (that is an 
interaction variable) has a positive sign, which suggests that the 
likelihood of choosing a non-working state increased with the 
level of the loss of earnings. This variable was computed as a 
function of expected annual earnings if people would work as 
scheduled, the ceiling level for compensation, replacement rate 
and compensated days of sickness, and it can take the same 
value for a high-income earner with no necessarily very long 
spells of sickness, and a low-income earner with a very long 
spell of sickness. The relationship between the number of 
sickness days and the loss of earnings due to (this) sickness is 
linear, but because of the benefit ceiling, people with high 
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earnings lost more than did those with low earnings for the same 
duration.  
The nonparametric analysis suggested that the average 
duration of the analyzed spells of long-term sickness differed 
across the exits. The multinomial estimates of duration dummies 
show that the more days of sickness people experienced, the 
higher was the probability of another exit than returning to 
work. The year when people started their sickness spell also had 
a significant effect on the exit type, which might be explained 
by events not captured by other variables. The diagnosis also 
had a significant effect on people’s exits. Comparing to the 
musculoskeletal group, persons with a mental diagnosis had a 
higher probability of exit into full disability instead of returning 
to work, while those with injuries or poisoning had a lower 
probability.  
7 Summary and conclusions 
Using the Swedish National Insurance Board’s LS-data for the 
period 1986-1991, exits from long-term sickness were analyzed 
by using both duration analysis and a multiple choice 
framework. This analysis in two steps was suggested by the 
complexity of the exit decision, which implies, in a very 
simplified framework, at least two aspects of the exit process: an 
aspect that governs the duration of sickness spell, and another 
that governs the type of exit. Therefore, first, the analysis of the 
duration of the sickness spells was done, and then, using a 
multinomial logit model, the analysis of process that governs the 
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type of exit was done. The results indicate that both individual 
characteristics, and push factors, such as regional 
unemployment, were important for the final output, and that 
there were some factors that had different effects for men and 
women.  
The estimates from the duration analysis showed that 
excepting the exit into partial disability for which the gender 
effect was not significant, women had shorter spells of sickness 
than men before return to work or exit into full disability, and 
longer spells when they had “other exit” types. Excepting partial 
disability exits, older employees had longer spells than the 
younger ones for all exit types. Except the group of “other exits” 
for which foreign-born people had shorter spells than people 
born in Sweden, the citizenship dummies were not significant by 
the conventional criteria. Excepting the disability exits, married 
people had shorter spells of sickness than those who were not 
married for all other three types of exit, results that could be 
interpreted either as the pressure of the economic incentive 
and/or a better health status of these people. For those who 
returned to work, people with medium and higher education had 
shorter spells than those with a lower educational level. 
Excepting the exits into disability, a higher regional 
unemployment rate implied longer spells for all other three types 
of exit.  
The multinomial logit analysis of the type of exit showed 
that the probability of not returning to work increased with age 
and by duration of the sickness spell, and decreased by year 
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during the period studied, which was a growth period. 
Compared to people born in Sweden, it was more likely that a 
foreign born person would exit into full disability or “other 
exits” instead of returning to work. Compared to those with a 
musculoskeletal diagnosis, it was more likely that a person with 
a mental diagnosis would exit into full disability instead of 
returning to work. 
Nevertheless, summing together the results of this study 
with the previous findings and theoretical foundation, it seems 
that, at least for those people who have been working before the 
sickness spells, it should be possible to make a greater use of 
their working capacity through active collaboration between 
patients, medical personnel qualified for evaluation of working 
capacity, employer, and social insurance officers. In this 
process, differences in the conditions and circumstances of 
different groups (such as, men and women, younger and older 
employees, etc.) should be considered. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the duration of the first spell of long-term sickness by 
exit type 
 
Exit type N % Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return to work 2021 75.80 109.0 179.73 202.59 60 1999 
Full disabilitry 338 12.68 608.5 711.57 377.85 76 2311 
Partial disability 97 3.64 664.0 791.46 479.91 60 2338 
Other exits 210 7.88 464.0 649.49 618.77 61 3096 
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Table 2 Competing risks model for exit destinations (the distribution of waiting time is 
reported in parentheses) 
 
 
Return to work 
(exponential) 
Full Disability 
(gamma) 
Partial disability 
(gamma) 
Other exit 
(Weibull) 
β HR β HR β HR β HR 
Intercept 6.99  8.06  8.12  7.01  
Female (CG: Male) -0.13 0.87 -0.15 0.86 -0.12 0.88 0.19 1.21 
Age-group (CG: <36 years)         
    36 – 45 years 0.29 1.33 0.31 1.37 -0.02 0.98 0.08 1.09 
    46 – 55 years 0.47 1.60 0.62 1.85 -0.31 0.73 -0.37 0.69 
    56 – 65 years 0.86 2.37 0.73 2.07 -0.68 0.50 -0.82 0.44 
Citizenship (CG: native)         
    Foreign born 0.10 1.11 -0.15 0.86 0.21 1.24 0.06 1.06 
    Naturalized Swede 0.07 1.07 -0.16 0.86 0.20 1.22 -0.22 0.81 
Married -0.08 0.92 -0.10 0.91 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.90 
Educational Level (CG: Low)         
    Medium  -0.12 0.89 -0.12 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.22 1.24 
    High -0.18 0.84 -0.30 0.74 0.13 1.14 0.40 1.49 
Earnings*  0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Regional Unemployment 0.04 1.04 0.03 1.03 -0.02 0.98 0.06 1.06 
Year when the spell started         
    1986 -1.31 0.27 -0.38 0.68 -0.27 0.76 -0.09 0.91 
    1987 -1.23 0.29 -0.45 0.64 -0.06 0.94 -0.17 0.84 
    1988 -1.06 0.34 -0.57 0.57 0.15 1.16 -0.16 0.85 
    1989 -1.11 0.33 -0.98 0.37 -0.38 0.69 0.18 1.20 
Diagnoses (CG: Musculosk.)          
Cardiovascular     0.11 1.12 -0.10 0.91 -0.06 0.94 0.14 1.16 
Respiratory       0.11 1.12 0.04 1.04 -0.20 0.82 -0.04 0.96 
Mental      -0.06 0.94 -0.18 0.84 -0.03 0.97 -0.20 0.82 
Gen. symptoms  -0.49 0.61 -0.17 0.84 0.51 1.66 0.23 1.26 
Injuries & poisoning -0.60 0.55 -0.03 0.97 -0.04 0.96 0.24 1.27 
Other diagnosis  -0.47 0.63 -0.67 0.51 0.05 1.05 -0.10 0.91 
Scale 1.00  0.56  0.60  0.47  
Events 2021  338  97  210  
Right censored values 645  2328  2569  2456  
Log likelihood -3841  -562.3  -258.3  -479.8  
Note: *in thousands of Swedish crowns; CG denotes the comparison group and HR denotes the hazard 
rate. Bolds indicate significant at the 10%-level or better. 
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Table 3 Multinomial logit results for various exits from sickness spells, compared to the 
alternative “return to work” 
 
 
Full Disability  Partial disability  Other exit 
Coef. RRR ME Std. Coef. RRR ME Coef. RRR ME 
Women (CG Men) -0.61 0.55 -0.005 0.00 -0.04 0.96 0.000 -0.61 0.55 -0.005 
Age-group (CG: <36 years)         
    36 – 45 years 0.57 1.76 0.005 0.00 0.97 2.64 0.005 0.57 1.76 0.005 
    46 – 55 years 1.71 5.55 0.015 0.01 1.52 4.56 0.009 1.71 5.55 0.015 
    56 – 65 years 2.93 18.73 0.025 0.01 2.61 13.63 0.015 2.93 18.73 0.025 
Citizenship(CG: Swedish born)         
    Naturalized Swede 0.03 1.03 0.000 0.00 -0.36 0.70 -0.002 0.03 1.03 0.000 
    Foreign born 0.82 2.28 0.007 0.00 -0.18 0.84 -0.001 0.82 2.28 0.007 
Married -0.01 0.99 0.000 0.00 -0.23 0.80 -0.001 -0.01 0.99 0.000 
Educational Level (CG: Low)         
Medium  -0.54 0.58 -0.005 0.00 0.03 1.03 0.000 -0.54 0.58 -0.005 
High -0.83 0.44 -0.007 0.00 -0.16 0.85 -0.001 -0.83 0.44 -0.007 
Earnings* -0.04 0.97 -0.003 0.00 -0.02 0.98 0.000 -0.04 0.97 -0.003 
Earnings Loss*  0.03 1.03 0.000 0.00 0.01 1.01 0.000 0.03 1.03 0.000 
Regional Unempl. -0.05 0.95 0.000 0.00 0.08 1.09 0.001 -0.05 0.95 0.000 
Duration of sickness spell (CG: 60-90 days)        
     91-180 days 1.31 3.72 0.011 0.01 -1.02 0.36 -0.006 1.31 3.72 0.011 
   180-366 days 1.75 5.73 0.014 0.01 1.24 3.47 0.007 1.75 5.73 0.014 
       > 366 days 3.07 21.59 0.025 0.01 2.96 19.35 0.016 3.07 21.59 0.025 
Year when the spell started         
     1986 -0.98 0.38 -0.008 0.00 -0.58 0.56 -0.003 -0.98 0.38 -0.008 
     1987 -0.68 0.51 -0.006 0.00 -0.94 0.39 -0.005 -0.68 0.51 -0.006 
     1988 -0.64 0.53 -0.005 0.00 -1.42 0.24 -0.008 -0.64 0.53 -0.005 
     1989 -1.54 0.21 -0.014 0.01 -0.29 0.75 -0.002 -1.54 0.21 -0.014 
Diagnoses (CG: Musculoskeletal)          
Cardiovascular     -0.13 0.88 -0.001 0.00 0.05 1.05 0.000 0.04 1.04 0.003 
Respiratory       0.29 1.34 0.002 0.00 0.80 2.22 0.004 0.53 1.70 0.032 
      Mental      0.51 1.67 0.004 0.00 0.12 1.13 0.001 0.47 1.60 0.029 
Gen symptoms  -0.32 0.73 -0.003 0.01 -0.73 0.48 -0.004 0.35 1.41 0.022 
Injuries & pois. -1.09 0.34 -0.009 0.00 -0.52 0.60 -0.003 -0.34 0.71 -0.020 
Other diagnosis  -0.01 0.99 -0.001 0.00 -0.32 0.73 -0.002 0.87 2.40 0.054 
Intercept -2.55   -0.019 0.01 -4.62   -0.024 -3.67   -0.225 
 
Note: *in thousands of Swedish crowns; Bolds indicate significant at the 5%-level or better; RRR means 
the relative risk ratio, ME denotes marginal effects, and CG is the comparison group.  
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Appendix  
Table A1 Descriptive statistics by individual at the beginning of the “first” spell of 
long-term sickness 
 
Variable 
All exits 
( n = 2666) 
Type of exit from long- term sickness 
Return to work 
( n = 2021) 
Full disability 
( n = 338) 
Partial disability 
( n = 97) 
Other 
( n = 210) 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Women  0.555 0.497 0.568 0.496 0.459 0.499 0.515 0.502 0.605 0.490
Age  43.703 11.817 42.067 11.459 52.914 9.127 51.247 9.584 41.138 11.781
Age groups     
    < 35 years 0.294 0.456 0.336 0.472 0.071 0.257 0.072 0.260 0.352 0.479
    36-45 years 0.242 0.428 0.260 0.439 0.115 0.320 0.175 0.382 0.295 0.457
    46-55 years 0.245 0.430 0.241 0.428 0.290 0.454 0.289 0.455 0.190 0.394
    56-65 years 0.219 0.414 0.163 0.369 0.524 0.500 0.464 0.501 0.162 0.369
Citizenship    
    Swedish born 0.845 0.362 0.850 0.358 0.840 0.367 0.907 0.292 0.786 0.411
    Nationalized Swedes 0.083 0.275 0.080 0.272 0.092 0.289 0.041 0.200 0.110 0.313
    Foreign born 0.072 0.259 0.070 0.256 0.068 0.252 0.052 0.222 0.105 0.307
Educational level    
    Low 0.634 0.482 0.603 0.489 0.837 0.370 0.722 0.451 0.562 0.497
    Medium 0.284 0.451 0.308 0.462 0.127 0.334 0.216 0.414 0.333 0.473
    High 0.082 0.275 0.089 0.284 0.036 0.185 0.062 0.242 0.105 0.307
Marital status    
    Unmarried 0.266 0.442 0.282 0.450 0.175 0.380 0.155 0.363 0.314 0.465
    Married 0.547 0.498 0.538 0.499 0.598 0.491 0.557 0.499 0.538 0.500
    Divorced 0.164 0.370 0.158 0.365 0.201 0.401 0.227 0.421 0.124 0.330
    Widowed 0.024 0.153 0.022 0.146 0.027 0.161 0.062 0.242 0.024 0.153
Young children (<7 years) 0.169 0.484 0.190 0.516 0.030 0.202 0.021 0.143 0.257 0.536
Children (7-16 years) 0.171 0.489 0.191 0.517 0.036 0.228 0.124 0.415 0.214 0.515
Days of sickness (spell 1) 306.42 371.91 179.73 202.59 711.58 377.86 791.46 479.92 649.49 618.77
Earnings* (1000 SEK) 160.29 76.388 165.240 77.050 132.936 76.796 146.917 74.215 162.875 58.738
Earnings loss (1000 SEK) 86.423 72.650 69.362 58.538 141.65 86.768 154.948 85.562 130.08 82.697
Regional unemployment, % 2.296 1.293 2.237 1.253 2.638 1.345 2.759 1.482 2.107 1.365
Diagnosis    
    Musculoskeletal 0.386 0.487 0.366 0.482 0.500 0.501 0.505 0.503 0.333 0.473
    Cardiovascular 0.068 0.252 0.055 0.229 0.127 0.334 0.144 0.353 0.057 0.233
    Respiratory 0.027 0.323 0.024 0.152 0.033 0.178 0.062 0.242 0.029 0.167
    Mental 0.118 0.161 0.114 0.318 0.130 0.337 0.103 0.306 0.148 0.356
    General symptoms 0.040 0.195 0.045 0.207 0.018 0.132 0.010 0.102 0.038 0.192
    Injuries & poisoning 0.130 0.337 0.155 0.362 0.038 0.193 0.062 0.242 0.071 0.258
    Other 0.232 0.422 0.241 0.428 0.154 0.361 0.113 0.319 0.324 0.469
Note: * Earnings are inflated using the 1997 CPI. 
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics for the duration of the first three long-term sickness 
spells by exit type 
 
Exit type N % Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LS1→W 2021 75.80 109 179.73 202.59 60 1999 
LS1→FD 338 12.68 608.5 711.57 377.85 76 2311 
LS1→PD 97 3.64 664 791.46 479.91 60 2338 
LS1→O 210 7.88 464 649.49 618.77 61 3096 
LS2→W 755 63.40 114 175.70 179.85 60 1696 
LS2→FD 114 10.48 514 568.42 302.57 115 1632 
LS2→PD 34 3.12 525 576.35 263.75 186 1259 
LS2→O 185 17.00 267 420.58 372.81 64 1904 
LS3→W 258 62.46 130 187.24 171.74 60 1309 
LS3→FD 40 9.69 519 528.42 254.35 62 1091 
LS3→PD 13 3.15 504 499.61 262.06 167 928 
LS3→O 102 24.70 315 401.11 322.69 60 1620 
Note: LS1 = the first spell of long-term sickness, LS2 = the second, LS3 = the third; W = return to work, 
FD = full (temporary or permanent) disability benefit, PD = partial (temporary or permanent) disability, 
and O = other (non-working) exits. 
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Figure A1 Graphical examination of the proportional hazards hypothesis 
 
 
 
Figure A2 Smoothed hazard of exiting long-tem sickness by destination 
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Table A3 Test of equality over strata 
Strata DF 
Test 
Log-Rank Wilcoxon -2Log(LR) 
Sex 1 7.35 8.95 10.4 
Age 3 71.63 92.17 91.58 
Education 2 16.83 31.41 19.06 
Exit type 3 943.77 780.02 1257.49 
Marital status 3 9.96 11.07 15.55 
Note: Bold -significant at less than 1%, and underline- significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table A4 Test of proportionality 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
 
Source 
Intercept 
Time 
 
DF 
3 
3 
 
Chi-Square 
1739.29 
549.07 
 
Pr > ChiSq 
<.0001 
<.0001 
 
                     
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Effect Parameter Estimate Std. Error Chi-Squared p 
Intercept 
 
 
Duration 
 
 
1 
2 (2|1) 
3 (3|1) 
4 (4|1) 
5 (2|3) 
6 (4|3) 
3.886 
0.314 
-1.136 
-0.005 
0.000 
0.001 
0.129 
0.146 
0.209 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
895.53 
4.58 
29.38 
402.45 
1.88 
4.89 
<.0001 
0.0324 
<.0001 
<.0001 
0.1706 
0.0271 
Note: Parameter 2 is the beta-coefficient for the contrast between type 1 (return to work) and type 2 (full 
disability) indicates that the hazard for full disability increased much more rapid than the hazard for 
return to work. Excepting parameter 5 (that is a contrast between type 3 and 2), all other parameters are 
significant, which means that proportionality can be rejected for all pairs of two hazard types. 
 
 
Table A5 Hausman's test for assumption "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" 
Alternative n Hausman df p 
Return to Work              645      15.89 38 0.9994 
Full Disability           2328     -12.01 38 1.0000 
Partial Disability             2569      -2.18  39 1.0000 
Others             2456       0.64  37 1.0000 
 
